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SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Thank you, Dean Glickstein. My function here is rather limited
at this point. After the first two speakers today, we will take a
brief break, then continue through until noon or 12:30, when we
will retire for lunch for one hour and then resume the program.
The afternoon portion of the program relates to a vitally
interesting segment of what the Supreme Court did in its last
term, and I hope that you will remain with us to hear Professors
Parker, Kaufman, and Zablotsky.
We traditionally start with one of Touro's great stars, Professor
Martin Schwartz, whose column you read, no doubt, every
month in the New York Law Journal. He is certainly one of the
outstanding authorities in this country relative to section 1983
civil rights litigation. He is the co-author of the standard work in
the field, "Section 1983 Litigation, Claims, Defenses, and Fees."
He has been cited by the United States Supreme Court, and while
that is important, even more important is that he is a professor at
this law school. Professor Schwartz teaches constitutional law,
federal courts and evidence, and is someone whose presentation
is always an outstanding feature of these conferences. He is
going to speak to us today, about the relevant section 1983 cases
and go a little bit far afield to deal with the Eleventh Amendment
and the Seminole Tribe Indian case. Professor Schwartz.
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Professor Martin A. Schwartz:
Good morning. Thank you, Judge Lazer. There is no more
important civil statute in American law than section 19831
because, after all, this is the mechanism that we have for
enforcing the Federal Constitution against state and local
government. I think that the United States Supreme Court
understands the importance of Section 1983, because for the past
several years, or certainly for as long as this program has been
presented, the United States Supreme Court has decided a rich
array of section 1983 decisions.
The decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in any given
term dealing with section 1983 are typically a mixed bag. There
are usually some that are pro-plaintiff2 and some that are pro-
defendant, 3 and that was true last term as well. I have grouped
the major decisions of the past term that impact upon section
1983 litigation into five areas. First, let me just list the areas,
and then I will go through them.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
2. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996)
and O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996).
3. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996).
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First, the Court rendered two important decisions dealing with
First Amendment retaliation claims. 4 Second, it issued an
important decision dealing with qualified immunity appeals. 5
Third, there was a major decision dealing with prisoners' rights,
specifically their right of access to the courts. 6 Fourth, there was
a decision dealing with psychotherapist-patient privilege. 7 And
finally, as Judge Lazer previously mentioned, there was a major
Eleventh Amendment decision. 8
Let me begin with the retaliation cases. First Amendment
retaliation claims constitute a large and very important subset
within the universe of section 1983 actions. These retaliation
claims are typically factually difficult. The defendant almost
never comes into court and says, "yes, we did what we did
because the plaintiff spoke out on a matter of public concern."
These are often fact specific cases, and they often present
difficult legal questions as well.
The plaintiffs' position in these cases is normally that the
government took some commodity away from them because they
chose to speak out on a matter of public concern. In some of the
cases it is because of the plaintiff's political affiliation. 9 A large
4. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996)
and O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996).
5. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996).
6. See Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).
7. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
8. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
9. See O'Hare Truck Serv. Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. at 2355.
The Court in O'Hare held that a government official could not terminate a
public employee based on his or her refusal to "support a political party or its
candidates, unless political affiliation is a reasonably appropriate requirement
for the job in question." Id. In making this determination the Court had to
decide whether to extend the protections set forth in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), to independent
contractors. O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2355. Elrod and Brand provided the
following standard for deciding when political parry affiliation may constitute
an acceptable reason for the dismissal of a public employee: "[Tlhe ultimate
inquiry is not whether the label policymaker or confidential fits a particular
position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective
19971
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percentage of these cases are brought by public employees who
claim, "I was fired," "I was demoted," "I was transferred,"
because of my exercise of free speech rights. But the claims are
not limited to public employees. Others, especially in recent
years, have been making increased use of the retaliation theory.
There have been cases bought, for example, by landowners
who have claimed, "I've been denied a permit," "I've been
denied a variance," or "the government seeks to condemn my
property," or "the government isn't enforcing its zoning laws
against neighboring property," because I chose to exercise my
free speech rights. 10 Prisoners have also filed claims, with some
frequency. that disciplinary charges have been lodged against
them because they exercised their right of freedom of speech or
their right to assert some type of prisoner grievance. 11 We have
also seen an increasing number of retaliation claims filed by
governmental contractors who claim they have been either denied
contracts or have had their contracts terminated because they
exercised their free speech rights.
On the question of whether the First Amendment gives a
government contractor protection against retaliation for either
speaking out on a matter of public concern or because of the
contractor's political affiliation, the circuit courts around the
country have been split. The key issue in these cases has been
whether the framework developed by the Supreme Court for
retaliation claims brought by public employees is also applicable
performance of the public office involved." Id. at 2357 (citing Branti, 445
U.S. at 518).
10. See Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that to effectively substantiate a retaliation claim under section 1983,
brought for a failure to enforce zoning laws, the plaintiff must first show that
his or her actions were protected by the first amendment) and Harrison v.
Springdale Water and Sewer Comm., 780 F.2d 1422, 1428 (8th Cir. 1986)
(stating that "an individual's constitutional right of access to the courts 'cannot
be impaired, either directly ...or indirectly, by threatening or harassing an
[individual] in retaliation for filing lawsuits'"). (citations omitted).
11. See Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1163 (5th Cir. 1995) (dealing with
a prisoner's allegations that prison officials "conspired to issue false
disciplinary reports in retaliation for his exercise of the constitutional right of
access to the courts").
[Vol 13
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for claims presented by governmental contractors. In two cases
decided last term, Board of Count), Commissioners v. Umbehr12
and O'Hare Truck Service v. City of Northlake,13 the Court ruled
that governmental contractors do have the right to assert free
speech First Amendment retaliation claims. 14
In O'Hare Truck Service, O'Hare, a truck operator, was on the
city's list of available towing companies for 28 years. 15 The
city's policy at this time was to remove a company from the list
only for cause. 16 During the year in question the mayor's re-
election campaign committee "asked" the owner of O'Hare for a
contribution to his re-election endeavor. 17 O'Hare not only
refused to contribute, but also decided to support the mayor's
12. 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996). This case involved an outspoken trash hauler
who was threatened by the County Board that he would lose his job. Id. at
2345. The Court, in determining whether the First Amendment protects
independent contractors, concluded that there was no relevant difference
between government employees and independent contractors that would justify
totally denying contractors free speech protection against retaliation by
government. Id. at 2352. The Court further held that both required the same
balancing test to determine the First Amendment issue, adjusted to take into
account the government interest in dealing with contractors rather that
employees. Id.
13. 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996). See footnote 9. The Court here also found
that similar First Amendment treatment of government employees and
independent contractors was appropriate. Id. at 2360.
14. See Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205.
Will County, I11., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (finding that "a teacher's exercise of
his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for
his dismissal from public employment"). Id. at 574. See also Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (concluding that in
deciding whether the "speech of a government employee is constitutionally
protected" the court must strike "a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees"). Id. at 574 (citing Pickering, 391
U.S. at 568).
15. O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2355.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2356. According to the allegations in the complaint, in fact. the
Mayor was actually demanuding a contribution from O'Hare, since O'Hare's
refusal to contribute prompted the removal of his towing company from the
city's list of available towing companies. Id.
1997]
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opponent. 18 O'Hare, in addition to supporting the opposing
candidate financially, went one step further, and chose to display
the opponent's campaign poster at his place of business. 19 This
apparently did not go over too well with the mayor, so the next
thing that happened, not too surprisingly, is that O'Hare Truck
Service was removed from the list of towing companies on the
city's rotation list.20
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the complaint in
O'Hare stated a proper First Amendment claim under section
1983.21 I am going to leave it to Professor Gora to flesh out the
various First Amendment aspects of these two decisions. But, I
would like to explain why I think they are important to the law of
section 1983.
First. they are important because I do not think there is a
logical way to distinguish between a First Amendment retaliation
claim asserted by a public employee and a First Amendment
retaliation claim asserted by a governmental contractor. It seems
to me that analytically it is the same type of claim. If there is a
plausible distinction between the two, I suppose it is the
distinction picked up by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion
that political patronage and political favoritism in government
contracting has, for a long time, been part of the American
tradition. 22 For Justice Scalia, if something is a part of American
tradition, he seems to almost automatically gives it the stamp of
constitutional approval. 23
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2358.
22. Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr. 116 S. Ct 2361, 2362 (1996).
Justice Scalia, with Justice Thomas joining, dissented in a decision written for
both Umbehr and O'Hare. Id.
23. Id. Justice Scalia stated that if tradition is not the basis of decision, the
constitutional text will be susceptible to any meaning. Id. See also Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinions in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979-1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) and Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) and his
plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
316 [Vol 13
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It is significant, however, that the majority in O'Hare did not
accept the argument that traditional practice is automatically
constitutional. In fact, the majority indicated that the so-called
long-standing American tradition of patronage in government
contracting has not always been noble, and in many instances has
been permeated with corruption and illegality, inviting
government manipulation. 24 The O'Hare situation is similar to
what one might describe as a shakedown; "pay up or else."
The contractor retaliation decisions are also important
considering the strong shift to privatization of government
services. These decisions tell the government; "look, you are not
going to be able to avoid your First Amendment obligations by
labeling the service provider a contractor rather than an
employee." 25 Finally, I think that these retaliation decisions may
be important to other types of retaliation claims that section 1983
plaintiffs have been asserting because, if the Court had drawn a
distinction between claims asserted by public employees and
claims asserted by governmental contractors, it may have raised
questions about whether those other than public employees are
entitled to assert First Amendment retaliation claims. For
example, the claims asserted by property owners and prisoners.
The decisions in these two cases are limited to the First
Amendment rights of existing contractors. 2 6 Professor Gora. we
will be interested in hearing what you have to say on this, but I
do not think that there is any logical way to limit the decision to
existing contractors as compared to applicants for governmental
contracts. I think that on this particular point Justice Scalia was
24. O'Hare at 2359.
25. Id. The mere fact that the victims of retaliation are not labeled
"employees" should not be reason to abate liability. Id. The Court feared that
the government, by attaching different labels to jobs, could avoid constitutional
liability. Id.
26. See id. at 2358-60 (discussing the right to bring a retaliation claim as a
government employed independent contractor); Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2352
(stating that "[blecause Umbehr's suit concerns the termination of a pre-
existing commercial relationship with the government, we need not address the
possibility of suits by bidders or applicants for new government contracts who
cannot rely on such a relationship").
19971
7
Schwartz: Section 1983
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997
TOURO LA W REVIEW
right, that it is just a matter of time, just until the Court gets the
next case, that the Court will hold that, just as governmental
contractors cannot have their contracts terminated because they
exercised free speech rights, so too applicants for governmental
contracts cannot have their applications denied because the
government disapproves of the free speech rights that were
exercised.27
Let me now move to the second area, qualified immunity. I
think that the words "qualified immunity" are probably two of
the most important words in section 1983 jurisprudence, and if
not the two most important words, I would say that they are at
least tied with the phrase "constitutional right." Certainly, the
defense of qualified immunity is the most important defense,
because what it does is protect a very broad array of executive
and administrative officials from personal liability, so long as the
officials have not violated any clearly established federal law. 28
The Supreme Court decisions dealing with qualified immunity
go further, providing an exception to the final judgment rule that
usually controls in Federal Court. This exception normally
allows an official whose application for qualified immunity has
27. See Unibehr, 116 S. Ct at 2367-68, (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia in his dissent stated that
[g]overnment contracting laws are clear and detailed, and
whether they have been violated is typically easy to ascertain:
the contract was put out for bid, or it was not. Unbehr's new
First Amendment, by contrast, requires a sensitive
"balancing" in each case; and the factual question of whether
political affiliation or disfavored speech was the reason for
the award or loss of the contract will usually be litigable. In
short, experience under the government-contracting laws has
little predictive value.
[d. at 2368.
28. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 647 (1987) (holding that
the defense of qualified immunity informs government officials that "they will
not be held personally liable as long as their actions are reasonable in light of
current American law"). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982) (stating that "government officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known").
318 [Vol 13
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been denied by the District Court the right to take an immediate
appeal to the court of appeals. 29 The thinking is that the right to
an immediate appeal is necessary in order to vindicate the
interests protected by qualified immunity. 30 This is not only an
immunity from liability, but an immunity from the burdens of
litigation, from having to defend the lawsuit. 3 1 The thinking is
that. if the District Court erroneously denies a claim for qualified
immunity and the official is forced to defend the case, an appeal
at the end of the case would come too late. 32 So the Supreme
Court held that we have to give the official the right to test out
the propriety of the denial of qualified immunity at the point of
the denial.
Now, the problem is that officials have been pursuing these
interlocutory qualified immunity appeals in record numbers and it
is very costly; 33 costly in terms of the additional workload of the
Courts of Appeals, and also costly to civil rights plaintiffs. 34
Because to be a civil rights plaintiff means that not only do I have
to think about the economic costs of a possible appeal from a
final judgment, but I now have to also think of the economic
costs of interlocutory immunity appeals. In addition to these
29. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (holding that "a district
court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an
issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment").
30. See id. at 525-27.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335. 1338-39 (7th Cir. 1989)
(discussing the various consequences resulting from the filing of frivolous
appeals on both the courts and the parties to an action).
34. Mitchell, 472 at 555-56 (Brennan, J.. dissenting). Justice Brennan. in
his dissenting opinion states his concern that the right to an immediate appeal
would create an enormous burden on both the judicial system and the
plaintiffs. Id. See also Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834. 842-47 (1996)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer in his analysis of the various reasons to
limit immunity appeals to one interlocutory appeal stated. "[iln sum, purpose.
precedent and practicality all argue for one interlocutory appeal per case and
no more." Id. at 847. He further stated that while qualified immunity interests
may be "important enough to justify one interlocutory appeal, [theyl are not
important enough to justify two." Id.
19971 319
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economic costs it is also costly in terms of time, because while
the interlocutory appeal is taking place, the District Court case is
put on hold. The case is stayed. 35
Going back one year to 1995, the Supreme Court in Johnson v.
Jones,36cut back on an official's right to pursue an interlocutory
appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, holding that these
interlocutory appeals lie only when the immunity issue can be
decided on appeal on the basis of what the Court called a pure or
neat -- the Supreme Court actually used the word neat -- neat
issue of law. 37 Namely, can the immunity defense be decided on
the question of whether there was a violation of clearly
established federal law?
In contrast, the Court in Johnson held, that if you have a
situation in which the District Court denies qualified immunity
raised on a motion for summary judgment because the District
Court finds that there are material issues of fact in dispute, the
official does not have the right to take an immediate appeal from
the denial of qualified immunity, because we do not want to
burden the federal appellate courts with interlocutory appeals that
35. Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the
filing of an interlocutory claim "divests the district court of jurisdiction to
proceed with trial . .. [and] this result could significantly disrupt and delay
trial court proceedings"). Id. at 105.
36. 115 S. Ct. 2151, (1995). The Supreme Court, in Johnson, was
presented with the issue of examining whether government officials have the
right to "seek an immediate appeal of a district court order denying their
motions for summary judgment" because there are material facts in dispute.
Id. at 2153.
37. The Supreme Court in Johnson stated:
considerations of delay, comparative expertise of trial and
appellate courts, and wise use of appellate resources, argue
in favor of limiting interlocutory appeals of "qualified
immunity" matters to cases presenting more abstract issues of
law. Considering these "competing considerations," we are
persuaded that "immunity appeals ... interfere less with the
final judgment rule if they are limited to cases presenting
neat abstract issues of law."
Id. at 2158. (citations omitted).
320 [Vol 13
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require the unraveling of a perhaps difficult and cumbersome
factual record. 38
Well, it seemed to me, based on the Court's analysis in
Johnson v. Jones, that the United States Supreme Court finally
saw the light. The Court, realizing what mischief interlocutory
immunity appeals were causing, decided to backtrack somewhat.
But, last term, in a case entitled Behrens v. Pelletier,39 the
38. The Court in Johnson stated that
1w]e recognize that, whether a district court's denial of
summary judgment amounts to (a) a determination about pre-
existing "clearly established" law, or (b) a determination
about "genuine" issues of fact for trial, it still forces public
officials to trial. And, to that extent, it threatens to undercut
the very policy (protecting public officials from lawsuits) that
(the Mitchell court held) militates in favor of immediate
appeals. Nonetheless, the countervailing considerations that
we have mentioned (precedent, fidelity to statute, and
underlying policies) are too strong to permit the extension of
Mitchell to encompass appeals from orders of the sort before
us.
Id.
39. 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996). Pelletier was dismissed from his position as
managing officer of a savings and loan association after Behrens, a federal
agent responsible for monitoring the operations of the savings and loan
association recommended his replacement. Id. at 837. Behrens sought the
dismissal because of his discovery that Pelletier was under investigation for
possible misconduct at another financial institution. Id. Pelletier then brought
this action seeking damages for various alleged constitutional wrongs. Id.
Behrens claimed the defense of "qualified immunity from suit" because he was
acting within his capacity as a government official. Id. Defendant's motion to
dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity was rejected by the District Court.
Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that "a denial of qualified immunity is an
appealable final order . . . and that one such interlocutory appeal is all that a
government official is entitled to and all that we will entertain." Id.. 837-38.
(citing Id., 968 F.2d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1992)). Behrens, after further
proceedings in the district court, made a subsequent motion for summary
judgment "on qualified immunity grounds, contending that his actions had not
violated any "clearly established right of respondent." Id. The District Court
denied this motion, and the denial was then appealed by Behrens to the Ninth
Circuit where it was dismissed "for lack of jurisdiction." Id. The Supreme
Court was presented with the question of whether "[a) defendant's immediate
appeal of an unfavorable qualified-immunity ruling on his motion to dismiss
deprives the court of appeals of jurisdiction over a second appeal. also based
1997l
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Supreme Court actually expanded the right of interlocutory
immunity appeal. 40 So it seems that whatever insightful analysis I
may have had about Johnson v. Jones has been undercut by
Behrens.
Now, in the Behrens case, the Supreme Court held that an
official who took an appeal from the denial of qualified immunity
that was raised on a motion to dismiss and was unsuccessful on
appeal, and then raised qualified immunity on a later motion for
summary judgment and was again unsuccessful, had the right to
take a second interlocutory immunity appeal. 4 1 The United States
Supreme Court, therefore, is now sanctioning multiple
interlocutory immunity appeals, with one proviso, that each
interlocutory appeal must present to the court of appeals, a pure
question of law. 42
When I think about the retaliation cases and the Behrens
qualified immunity appeal case together. it makes me wonder
whether the United States has some grand master plan that
attempts to create some type of equilibrium in the law of section
1983. Does the Court say to itself, "now that we've given the
plaintiffs the right to pursue retaliation claims, maybe it is time to
add some points to the defense side and strengthen immunity
defenses?" Whether that's true or not, and of course I do not
think that it is really true, I do not think there's some big chart
someplace in the Supreme Court building, clearly there is no
equilibrium when it comes to prisoners rights in the United States
Supreme Court.
on qualified immunity, immediately following denial of summary judgment."
Id. at 836. The Court held that it does not. Id. at 838-42.
40. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
41. Id.
42. Behrens. 116 S. Ct at 840-41 (stating that, although there is no limit to
the number of interlocutory appeals that may be filed, the possibility that this
power will be abused may be limited by the requirement that such claims "turn
on an issue of law" thereby allowing the courts to "weed out frivolous
claims"). Id. at 841.
322 [Vol 13
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The 1977 Supreme Court decision in Bounds v. Smith, 43 ruled
that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts,
and that this right requires the government to provide prisoners
with either adequate law libraries or assistance from individuals
with legal training. The lower courts have struggled with the
meaning of Bounds v. Smith; determining for example, the extent
of the right, the adequacy of the law library, and the type of legal
assistance that the State must provide.44 The issue of the extent
of the right recognized in Bounds v. Smith came before the
United States Supreme Court last term in Lewis v. Casey.45
43. 430 U.S. 817 (1977). State prison inmates brought actions against the
state for failing to provide adequate legal library facilities, denying them
reasonable access to the courts and equal protection as guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 818. The Supreme court held that the fundamental
constitutional right of access to courts requires prison authorities to assist
inmates in legal matters by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from legally trained people. Id. at 828.
44. See Blake v. Berman, 877 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1989) (questioning
whether a particular "access" caused a prisoner's injuries): Germany v.
Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 11 (Ist Cir. 1989) (examining whether state caseworkers
unconstitutionally denied court access to a juvenile offender): Smith v. Bands.
841 F.2d 77, 78 (4th Cir. 1988) (inquiring into the adequacy of training
provided to prisoner paralegals staffing the prison law library, the assessment
of photocopy charges against prisoners unable to pay, the limitation of library
privileges imposed as a disciplinary action and the practice of providing library
access by means of short term transfers); Cookish v. Cunningham. 787 F.2d 1.
5 (1st Cir. 1986) (conducting an examination of the adequacy of the contents of
the prison law library); Harrington v. Holshauser, 741 F.2d 66, 67 (4th Cir.
1984) (examining whether the state has complied with the directions cited in
Bowzds); Rich v. Zitnay, 644 F.2d 41, 42 (Ist Cir. 1981) (dealing with
prisoners claiming that they were without counsel or a library containing their
particular state law) and Spates v. Manson, 619 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1980)
(discussing the inadequacies in access to legal matters); Blake v. Berman, 625
F. Supp. 1523, 1525 (D. Mass. 1986) (questioning whether the Dept. of
Corrections Commissioners provided prisoners with adequate legal assistance
despite the fact that the library did not contain the state law of a particular
state. but where alternative services were available).
45. 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996). In Lewis, the inmates brought a civil rights
action against prison officials for violating their constitutional right of access to
the courts. Id. at 2177. The Supreme Court decided the case on three points:
(1) an inmate claiming denial of access to courts cannot establish actual injury
just by proving that the prison law library or legal assistance program is not
19971
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In Lewis v. Casey, the Supreme Court was asked to review the
propriety of the issuance by the District Court of a twenty-five
page injunctive order designed to implement Bounds v. Smith.46
The District Court decree detailed what exactly had to be in the
law library and the type of legal assistance the State of Arizona
had to provide. 47 I think that most individuals who follow the
Supreme Court in the area of prisoners' rights probably were not
surprised that the United States Supreme Court did not allow the
twenty five page detailed decree to stand.4 8 It was not completely
expected, however, that the Supreme Court would dilute the
prisoner right of access to the courts to the point it did or in the
manner that it did, especially after recognition of the right in
Bounds v. Smith.4 9
But let me explain what I mean. First of all, the Court held
that a prisoner who alleges a violation of his or her constitutional
right of access to the courts has to demonstrate not only that the
law library or the legal assistance program is inadequate, but has
to make a further showing that the prisoner has a nonfrivolous
legal claim that has been frustrated or impeded by the
inadequacy.50 The Supreme Court states that the prisoner is
unable to establish injury unless the inadequacy of the law library
or the legal assistance program is the cause of frustration in the
assertion of a nonfrivolous claim. 5 1 Now, if you think about it,
that sets up a pretty interesting catch-22 situation. Right? How
about the prisoner who says, well, look, I can't tell, I can't tell
adequate in some theoretical sense and must show that the inadequacy
frustrated the prisoner's assertion of a non-frivolous claim: (2) two illiterate or
non-English speaking inmates who suffered actual injury did not support
systemwide injunction mandating detailed changes: and (3) delays in receiving
legal assistance did not violate defendant's constitutional right of access. Id. at
2178-85.
46. Id. at 2178.
47. Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1553, 1555-69 (D. Ariz. 1992).
48. Lewis at 2200 (stating that systemwide relief is never appropriate when
there is no systemwide violation, and even then the relief should be no broader
and should last no longer than necessary to fix the constitutional violation).
49. Id. at 2182.
50. Id. at 2181.
51. Id. at 2182.
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whether or not I have a nonfrivolous claim, because the law
library is inadequate, you know, they do not have the most recent
Federal Reporter, nor do they have the Federal Supplement. The
Supreme Court also ruled that the prisoner's right to access to the
courts only includes the means to challenge the conviction,
sentence or conditions of confinement. It does not give the
prisoner the right to assert any other type of legal claim. 52
The language used in the Court's opinion signals the feelings of
the Court on the issue. Justice Scalia stated that prisoners have
no right to transfer themselves into litigating engines, capable of
filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip and
fall claims. 53 I am not sure why a slip and fall claim in prison is
not part of prison conditions. And, I asked a good friend of
mine, who's been involved in prisoners' rights litigation for
many years, "Do you find that prisoner shareholder derivative
suits is one of the major social problems of the day?" He assured
me that it absolutely is not.
I think that the Court's inclusion of "litigating engine" and
"shareholder derivative" language signals its sentiments about the
issue. Again, Justice Scalia is writing. Although he tends to be
on the colorful side, I think you can see that the Court is taking a
rather negative view of the right of access to the courts. 54
The Court also said that the Bounds decision must be read in
pari materia with the deferential standard that the Court had
previously articulated in a case named Turner v. Safley.55 In
Turner, the Court decided that prison policies only have to be
rationally related to a legitimate penological objective and that
52. Id.
53. Id. Justice Scalia perceived, seemingly, that the prisoners' intent is to
become litigating engines rather than legitimate defenders of their entitled
constitutional rights. Id.
54. Id.
55. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). This case regarded the constitutionality of
regulations set forth by the Missouri Division of Corrections relating to
correspondence and marriages among inmates. Id. at 81. The Supreme Court
ruled that the governing standard for determining the constitutionality of prison
rules is whether the rule is reasonably related to legitimate penological
objectives. The Court upheld the Division of Corrections correspondence
regulation, but not the marriage regulation. Id.
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standard is heavily deferential to the judgment of prison
officials. 56 And I was sort of wondering, you know, the Court
used the phrase in pari materia. The Justices could have just
said "together." But I think they used the Latin to tell us they
really mean business. To tell us they mean business, the Latin
phrase comes out.
I think that when you put this whole picture together, I do not
think there's a lot left to the Bounds v. Smith constitutional right
of prisoner access to the courts. Obviously, the states have to
have some type of law library or some type of legal assistance
program, but I do not think we're going to see, after Lewis v.
Casey. prisoners prevailing in too many of these cases.
Moving on, in Jaffee v. Redmond,57a section 1983 suit, the
United States Supreme Court for the first time recognized a
psychotherapist-patient privilege; an unqualified privilege was
recognized. 58 Some of the lower federal courts that had
recognized the privilege recognized it as a qualified privilege,
balancing the need for the information against the need for
confidentiality. 59 The Supreme Court not only held that there was
an unqualified privilege, but that the privilege extended beyond
the psychotherapist to less extensive, more accessible social
workers.60
56. Id. at 87-90.
57. 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996) (dealing with the admissibility into evidence of
statements made by a patient to a psychotherapist; whether there is a
"psychotherapist privilege under ruie 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence").
Id. at 1925.
58. id. at 1928. The Court, in concluding that such a privilege does exist,
stated that "a privilege protecting confidential communications between a
psychotherapist and her patient promotes sufficiently important interests to
outweigh the need for probative evidence." Id. (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 1927 (finding that "[tihe United States courts of appeals do not
uniformly agree that the federal courts should recognize a psychotherapist
privilege under Rule 501"). Id. See also In re Doe. 964 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir.
1992) (recognizing "the existence of a [qualified] psychotherapist-patient
privilege under Rule 501"). Id. at 1328.
60. Id. at 1931. The Court stated
[we have no hesitation in concluding in this case that the
federal privilege should also extend to confidential
communications made to licensed social workers in the
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It is interesting, at least to me, that the case arose in the context
of a police officer who had used deadly force and, troubled by
this use of force, then consulted a social worker. The case arose
from the plaintiff seeking the notes that came out of those
counseling sessions. 61 Normally these types of issues come up
the other way. For example, an individual sues a municipality
and police officers and it is the municipal attorneys who think
there is something wrong with this plaintiff who has filed suit.
The municipality thinks there are one or more loose screws in the
plaintiff, and it is the defendant who is seeking communications
that the plaintiff had with the therapist. 62
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, saw in Jafee very little
value in consulting a therapist because, in his view, when an
individual has a problem. in this country the tradition is for the
individual to speak to either a relative, a friend or a bartender. 63
He said it. I didn't make that up.
Now, I think that this decision is important for a number of
reasons. First of all, since the Federal Rules of Evidence were
course of psychotherapy . . . drawing a distinction between
the counseling provided by costly psychotherapists and the
counseling provided by more readily accessible social
workers serves no discernible public purpose.
Id. (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 1925-26.
62. See Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462 (lth Cir. 1992). This case
involved a cause of action filed by Hancock against a Georgia police officer.
Hobbs, for arrest without probable cause. Id. at 464-65. The court of appeals
determined that the lower court did not err in allowing the introduction into
evidence of the plaintiff's prior psychiatric treatment, holding that such
evidence was not privileged against disclosure. Id. at 466-67. See also Dixon
v. City of Lawton, Okla., 898 F.2d 1443 (10th Cir. 1990) (involving the
production of medical records indicating prior drug use of the plaintiff as
evidence in an action for wrongful death brought against three police officers).
63. Jaffee. 116 S. Ct. at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia in his
dissent stated his dissatisfaction with recognizing the psychotherapist-patient
privilege by asking when "the psychotherapist came to play such an
indispensable role in the maintenance of the citizenry's mental health?" In the
past, before the current trend toward seeking professional counseling, people
would rely on the advice of "parents, siblings, best friends and bartenders -
none of whom was awarded a privilege against testifying in court." Id.
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enacted in 1975. whenever a privilege issue came to the United
States Supreme Court. the Court took a very negative view of the
evidentiary privilege. 64 This has been the trend around the
country; the privileges are falling into disfavor. 65 But this
decision in Jafee, I think, shows that the Supreme Court is
willing to recognize a new evidentiary privilege when there is
justification for it. 66 In recognizing this privilege, the United
States Supreme Court has brought the Federal Courts into line
with the decisional and statutory law of all of the other 50 states
and the District of Columbia, because it turns out that every state
and the District of Columbia has some type of psychotherapist-
patient privilege. 67 Obviously the privileges are not the same in
each State. Some are qualified, some are unqualified, some
extend to social workers and some do not. Nevertheless, they all
have some type of psychotherapist-patient privilege.
64. See 3 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 7.2 at 238 (2d ed. 1995 and Supp. 1997) (stating that "the
Supreme Court has stressed that '[elvidentiary privileges in litigation are not
favored' and should be strictly construed.'"). (citations omitted). See
generall' id. at 238-41.
65. See id. at 1932-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia in his dissent
in Jaffee summarized this attitude, stating that the Supreme Court has always,
in the past. understood that the role of the courts to preserve justice "is
severely harmed by contravention of 'the fundamental principle that the public
• ..has a right to every man's evidence."' Id. at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
(citations omitted). He further stated that the testimonial privileges "are not
lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the
search for truth." Id. (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 1931. The Court stated:
Because we agree with the judgment of the state legislatures
and the Advisory Committee that a psychotherapist-patient
privilege will serve a 'public good transcending the normally
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth,' we hold that confidential communications
between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the
course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from
compelled disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
Id.
67. Id. at 1929 n. 11 (providing a list of each State and appropriate statute
section).
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I think that the decision is also important because, Justice
Scalia's view notwithstanding, the decision reflects the common
wisdom that psychotherapy is only likely to be effective if the
individual feels that he or she can speak freely with the therapist
without fear that the communication might later be divulged. 68
Finally, I get to the major Eleventh Amendment decision of last
term, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. the State of Florida.69 As
Judge Lazer pointed out, this is not a section 1983 case. But
unlike Judge Lazer, I do not really think it takes us far afield
from the law of section 1983, because I think that whatever the
Supreme Court says about the Eleventh Amendment is potentially
significant on the issue of section 1983 actions that attempt to
establish state governmental liability. 70
68. Id. at 1928-29 (discussing the necessity of patient confidentiality in
developing the type of relationship required for the successful treatment of
psychotherapy patients).
69. 116 S. Ct 1114 (1996). Seminole Tribe involved the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act. This act "provides that an Indian tribe may conduct certain
gaming activities only in conformance with a valid compact between the tribe
and the State in which the gaming activities are located." Id. at 1119. In
Seminole Tribe the petitioner alleged that the State "'refused to enter into any
negotiation for inclusion of [certain gaming activities] in a tribal-state
compact,' thereby violating the requirement of good faith negotiation"
contained in the Act. Id. at 1121. The Court in its decision provided that
[t]he Act, passed by Congress under the Indian Commerce
Clause, U.S. Const., Art, I, § 8, cl. 3, imposes upon the
States a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe
toward the formation of a compact, §2710(d)(3)(A), and
authorizes a tribe to bring suit in federal court against a State
in order to compel performance of that duty. § 2710(d)(7).
We hold that notwithstanding Congress' clear intent to
abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian
Commerce Clause does not grant Congress that power, and
therefore § 2710(d)(7) cannot grant jurisdiction over a State
that does not consent to be sued. We further hold that the
doctrine of Ex parte Young may not be used to enforce §
27 10(d)(3) against a state official.
Id. at 1119.
70. See I MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS,
DEFENSES, AND FEES Ch. 8 (2d ed. 1991 and Supp. I & 2 1996) (providing a
full discussion of state liability under the Eleventh Amendment).
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Now, the decision, which is a pro Eleventh Amendment
decision, favoring the state's sovereign immunity from federal
court liability, was brought to you by the same five-justice
majority that brought us the decision in United States v. Lopez. 7 1
In Lopez. for the first time in 60 years, the Supreme Court held
that an Act of Congress was beyond Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce. 72 The media very quickly and very
insightfully picked up on the fact that the alignment of the
justices in United States v. Lopez and Seminole Tribe was exactly
the same, and I think that the media correctly perceived both
decisions as being part of the majority's efforts to curb the
powers of the federal government -- in the case of Seminole Tribe
the powers of the Federal Courts -- and return power to the
states.73
Now, what did the United States Supreme Court do in its
controversial five-to-four decision? First, it reaffirmed that
despite the language of the Eleventh Amendment that bars a suit
by a citizen of one state against another state, the amendment
applies when the plaintiff brings suit against his or her own state.
71. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the
majority opinions in which Justices O'Connor. Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas
joined. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connor
Joined. Justice Thomas also filed a concurring opinion. Justices Stevens and
Souter filed dissenting opinions, and Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion.
in which Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 1625. In
Seminole Tribe, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined, Justice Stevens
filed a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter also filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at
1119.
72. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. The Court in Lopez was asked to
determine whether the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded the authority
vested in Congress as a result of its commerce clause authority. Id. at 1626.
The Congress. by passing this Act, "made it a federal offense 'for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows,
or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."' Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §
922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The Court held that the Act exceeds the
authority given to Congress "[tlo regulate Commerce .. .among the several
States . . . ." Id. (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
73. See supra notes 68 and 70 and accompanying text.
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Forget the language of the Eleventh Amendment, it means
virtually nothing. 74 In almost every significant way, the Eleventh
Amendment is interpreted to mean the exact opposite of what it
says. 75 And that is true in this respect also, even though the
language says that federal judicial power does not include a suit
by a citizen of one state against another state - the United States
Supreme Court says, no, no, no, the Eleventh Amendment also
encompasses a suit brought by an individual against her own
state. 76 The Court thus reaffirmed the holding in Harris v.
Louisiana.77
Now, you know, this is not just a technical issue. This
becomes another way of saying that the Eleventh Amendment is
not limited to diversity cases and applies in federal question
cases, and that is why this interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment is so important. One reason that the United States
Supreme Court, at least the majority, is able to construe the
Eleventh Amendment in direct contrast to its language is because
a majority of the justices take the position that behind the
Eleventh Amendment lies a broader common law state
governmental sovereign immunity. 78
74. Id. at 1122-24.
75. Id. at 1122. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "I[the Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
The Court in Seminole Tribe further stated that the Eleventh Amendment
stands for the following two part presupposition: "first, that each State is a
sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that 'it is inherent in the
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent.'" Id.
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
77. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
78. Seminole Tribe at 1125. The Court stated
[W]e have often made it clear that the relief sought by a
plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the
suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment . . .We think it
follows a fortiori from this proposition that the type of relief
sought is irrelevant to whether Congress has power to
abrogate States' immunity. The Eleventh Amendment does
not exist solely in order to "prevent federal court judgments
19971
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Now, the big issue in Seminole Tribe, if you go back to 1989,
the Supreme Court had decided in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Company79 that the Congress, when it exercises its commerce
power, has the authority to override the Eleventh Amendment. 80
It is another way of saying that the Congress can force a waiver
of the states' Eleventh Amendment protection. But, in Seminole
Tribe, only seven years after the 1989 decision, the United States
Supreme Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas and held,
very significantly, that Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce does not include, the power to override the Eleventh
Amendment. 8 1
There was a very long dissenting opinion by Justice Souter. 82
Justice Souter and the majority engaged in what might be known
as the battle of the first times. Justice Souter. starts out his
dissenting opinion stating that this is the first time since the
founding of the Republic that the Supreme Court has held that
Congress has no authority to subject state government to liability
in cases brought under federal question jurisdiction. 83 The
majority responded saying, well, we have our own first time.
The majority says, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas is the first time
that the United States Supreme Court has ever held that
that must be paid out of a State's treasury," it also serves to
avoid "the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive
process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private
parties."
Id. at 1124. (citations omitted).
79. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (determining that the Interstate Commerce Clause,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. allowed Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity
because the ability to regulate interstate commerce would be "incomplete
without the authority to render States liable in damages"). Id. at 19-20.
80. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
81. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128. The Court stated that "the result
in Union Gas and the plurality's rationale depart from our established
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine the accepted
function of Article III. We feel bound to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly
decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled." Id.
82. Id. at 1145-1185 (Souter, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Congress's commerce power entitles the Congress to override the
Eleventh Amendment. 84
Now, I think that, at least for the present, the Congressional
power to override the Eleventh Amendment is limited to
Congressional action under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 85 Section 5 gives Congress the power to enact
appropriate legislation for the purpose of enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment. 86 And I think that if you read Seminole
Tribe carefully, the majority decision probably is not limited to
the commerce power, but I think there is a broader holding, that
other than Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
simply does not have the power to override the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Finally, the Court in Seminole Tribe, this is interesting, after
saying, well, this is really no big deal because individuals can
always get prospective relief against state government in federal
court to prevent future violations of federal law under the
doctrine of Ex parte Young. 87 But after pointing out that
84. Id. at 1125.
85. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In Fitzpatrick. the
Court "recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment. by expanding federal
power at the expense of state autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance
of state and federal power struck by the Constitution." Seminole Tribe. 116 S.
Ct. at 1125 (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455). The Court found that § I of
the Fourteenth Amendment provided "prohibitions expressly directed at the
States and that § 5 of the Amendment expressly provided that "The Congress
shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125. (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S.
at 453). The Court, in Fitzpatrick, held that "§ 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed
by that Amendment." Id.
86. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
87. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132. The Court in Seminole Tribe
stated that despite
the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment . . .since
our decision in Ex parte Young, we often have found federal
jurisdiction over a suit against a state official when that suit
seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to "end a
continuing violation of federal law."
Id. at 1132. (italics added for emphasis).
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prospective relief to compel compliance with federal law is not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court went on and held
that the Ex parte Young remedy was not available in the case at
hand. 88 In the particular case, the Native American Tribe had
sought to enforce the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 89 IGRA
(hereinafter referred to as "IGRA"). The Court said that we're
not going to allow the Young remedy in this case, because to
allow the Young remedy would interfere with Congress's Indian
Gaming Regulatory scheme that was very carefully developed
and detailed governing gambling operations on Indian
reservations. 90
Now, the Court's decision does leave in place the doctrine of
Ex parte Young. 9 1 There was no attempt to overturn that
doctrine. 92 It is solely a ruling based upon Congressional intent,
the finding that in this case, given this detailed, regulatory
scheme under IGRA. that the Young remedy is not available. 93
But, I think it is important, because, as the dissenting justices
pointed out, this is the first time that the United States Supreme
Court has ever denied the Ex parte Young remedy for a violation
of federal law. It certainly makes you wonder whether, down the
road. the Supreme Court may be thinking about some
modification of the Young remedy itself. 94
rhank you very much.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The Court stated "[w]here Congress has prescribed a detailed
remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created
right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and
permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young." Id.
91. Id. at 1133 (leaving the doctrine of Ex Parte Young in place while
concluding that it is inapplicable to the case at bar). "Under Ex parte Young a
'tederal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state
officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law"'
Id. at 1178. (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 1133.
93. Id. at 1133, n. 17 (stating that "[c]ontrary to the claims of the dissent,
we do not hold that Congress cannot authorize federal jurisdiction under Ex
parte Young over a cause of action with a limited remedial scheme"). Id.
94. 1d. at 1181 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Any questions? If there are any questions, we can reserve a
couple minutes right now. Does anyone have any questions?
Yes. Can you stand up? Would you speak loudly? The acoustics
are peculiar in this room.
The Audience:
In view of the lineup of the justices in this latter decision,
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, do you feel this might be a
uniquely political type of decision which is ultimately based not
on any strong continuing logic in the law but based on the
conservative lineup that's shared by the Chief Justice?
Professor Martin A. Schwartz:
No. I do not like to use the word political. Maybe you are
speaking about the same thing without using the word political.
But I think it is based upon a legal philosophy that the powers of
the federal courts in Seminole Tribe, the powers of Congress in
the United States v. Lopez, have been extended to an
unacceptable degree, and simultaneously that means that the
powers of the state and local government have been intruded
upon to an unacceptable degree. And I think that the attempt by
this five-justice majority is to bring about simultaneous
modifications by cutting back on federal power and extending
state power, and they go hand in hand together. Because, for
example, if you have a broader interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment and you deny the federal courts the power to grant
certain relief against state government, that would leave state
prerogatives more in place. The Eleventh Amendment, I think it
is important to understand, is very much of a states' rights
Amendment, you know. It is one of the parts of the Constitution
that regulates federalism. The real question, I think, and I have
no way to answer the question, is how far is this going to go. In
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the next term of the Supreme Court there are cases in which the
Court has granted review dealing with both of these issues. One
of the cases that is up before the Supreme Court deals with the
Brady Handgun Bill and the power of Congress to require
municipal officials to make background checks on those who
have applications to purchase handguns, 95 and that case very
much deals with the relevant powers of Congress on the one
hand, and local government on the other hand. Interestingly,
very shortly, within a week or two after Seminole Tribe was
decided, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in another
Eleventh Amendment case dealing with Native American
tribes. 96 So we will be watching next term to see where these
two issues go. They are definitely within the area of balance of
power between the federal government and state and local
government.
95. Printz v. United States, Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503 (oral argument Dec. 3,
1996).
96. Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho, No. 94-1474 (oral argument
October 16. 1996).
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